Abstract: This paper utilizes a Markov-switching framework to model excess returns in federal funds futures contracts. This framework identifies a high-volatility state where excess returns are large, positive, and volatile and a low-volatility state where excess returns have a lower volatility and are small in absolute value. Federal funds futures rates require adjustment for excess returns only in the high-volatility state. Intermeeting rate cuts of the federal funds rate target always correspond with the high-volatility regime and can explain much of the variation in excess returns. This paper also examines previous return models and helps clarify the relationship between excess returns, business cycles, and intermeeting rate cuts. In real-time forecasting, however, the unadjusted futures rates outperform three different forecasting models. This result strengthens the case for unadjusted futures rates as a measure of monetary policy expectations.
Introduction
Federal funds futures contracts are popular tools for estimating monetary policy expectations. Both academic researchers and private sector forecasters use these contracts to derive the expected path of the federal funds rate over the coming months. Recent research, however, provides evidence that futures rates require adjustment for excess returns. Under the expectations hypothesis, federal funds futures contracts should not differ systematically from the average effective federal funds rate over the contract expiration month. Using notation from Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) , this implies: f (n) t = E t [r t+n ], where f (n) t is the contract rate of an n-month ahead contract at time t and E t [r t+n ] is the expected value of the effective federal funds rate over month t + n. Any difference between the futures rate and the actual federal funds rate over the expiration month reflects returns in excess of the risk-free rate. If significant excess returns exist in the futures contracts, the futures rates require adjustment to accurately estimate monetary policy expectations. This paper utilizes a Markov-switching framework to model excess returns in federal funds futures contracts. This framework identifies a high-volatility state where excess returns are large, positive, and volatile and a low-volatility state where excess returns have a lower volatility and are small in absolute value. Federal funds futures rates require adjustment for excess returns only in the high-volatility state. Intermeeting rate cuts of the federal funds rate target always correspond with the high-volatility regime and can explain much of the variation in excess returns. This paper also examines previous excess return models and helps clarify the relationship between excess returns, business cycles, and intermeeting rate cuts. In real-time forecasting, however, the unadjusted futures rates outperform three different forecasting models. This result strengthens the case for unadjusted futures rates as a measure of monetary policy expectations.
Previous work generally rejects the expectations hypothesis and finds evidence of some type of excess returns in federal funds futures contracts. Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) find that average excess returns vary from 3 basis points on a 1-month ahead contract to 30 basis points on a 6-month ahead contract. Durham (2003) and Sack (2004) use slightly different time periods of data and find positive average excess returns which increase across longer maturity contracts. While previous work does find evidence of average excess returns, studies differ on their conclusions about timevarying excess returns. Using the term-structure of the implied federal funds rates, Durham (2003) finds highly volatile time-varying excess returns on short term contracts. Under the assumption that policy expectations level out over time, Sack (2004) determines that excess returns increase with contract length and vary over time. Durham (2003) also finds conflicting evidence about timevarying excess returns using two different asset-pricing approaches. Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) determine that excess returns in the 1988-2005 sample period tend to be predictable and move countercyclical with the business cycle. They also show that ignoring these excess returns biases forecasts of the expected path of monetary policy.
Data
This paper uses 30-day federal funds futures contracts purchased from the Chicago Board of Trade. The payout on these futures contracts is the difference between the contract rate and actual average effective federal funds rate over the expiration month. 1 This paper uses language and notation consistent with Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) and defines excess returns on federal funds futures contracts as: rx
where r t+n is the ex post realized average effective federal funds rate over month t + n and f (n) t is the futures rate of an n-month ahead contract at time t. 2 I sample the futures rates across contracts ranging from 1 to 6 months ahead from the last day of each month t.
Changes in the Federal Reserve's communication policy govern the sample selection for this paper. The Federal Reserve began announcing changes to the federal funds rate target after May 1994 and began releasing the specific target rate after July 1995. These changes in Federal Reserve policy drastically increase the information available to the federal funds futures market which decreases the volatility of the excess returns. 3 Most previous studies examining excess returns in federal funds futures do not recognize the significance of this policy change and use sample periods that cover both the before and after 1994 period. 4 This paper extends the work of Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) who use the 1988-2005 sample period. 5 Although futures rates are available from 1988, my sample consists of 139 monthly observations from January 1995 to July 2006. This sample period avoids possible market microstructure issues associated with this policy change and is a more accurate representation of the current futures market.
Constructing excess returns using equation (1) introduces a potentially problematic econometric issue. Hansen and Hodrick (1980) and Hakkio (1981) discuss that an n-month ahead forward rate like (1) will suffer from n − 1 lags of autocorrelation due to contract overlap. Appendix A examines this issue in detail and shows that the results in this paper are robust with respect to autocorrelation and alternative specifications.
Excess Returns in Federal Funds Futures Contracts

Markov-Switching Average Excess Return
The Markov-switching framework in this paper derives from Hamilton (1989) and Kim and Nelson (1999) and allows the mean and variance of the average excess return to vary with an unobserved state variable, S t . The following two-state Markov chain governs the evolution of S t :
where p ij = P [S t = j|S t−1 = i] for i = 0, 1 and j = 0, 1. A nonlinear iterative filter formulates probabilistic estimates of the unobserved state variable using the data and constructs the loglikelihood function. The log-likelihood function is maximized numerically using the Nedler-Mead simplex algorithm over a large grid of starting values. Using the Markov-chain from (2), this paper models excess returns using the following specification:
where rx
t+n is the excess return of the n-month ahead contract, α (n) is a constant, S t is the unobserved state variable, and ε
. The Markov-switching framework of (3) permits, but does not require, both α (n) (S t ) and σ(S t ) to vary with the unobserved state variable. While both α (n) (S t ) and σ(S t ) must switch regimes at the same time, the data determines the timing and frequency of the switches.
The switching framework detects two distinct states in the average excess returns. The framework identifies a high-volatility state where the average excess returns are large, positive, and very volatile and a low-volatility state where the average excess returns have a lower volatility and are small in absolute value. The results of equation (3) appear in Table 1 where S t = 0 corresponds to the high-volatility state and S t = 1 corresponds to the low-volatility state. As the name of each regime implies, the Markov-switching framework finds that the state-dependent variance under S t = 0 is considerably higher than under S t = 1. Across all contract lengths, the state-dependent variance is at least four times larger in the high-volatility regime. The average excess returns in the high-volatility regime are highly significant across all contract lengths and range from 7.63 basis points on a 1-month ahead contract to 93.20 basis points on a 6-month ahead contract. In the low-volatility regime, the excess returns are small and insignificant for the 1 to 3-month ahead contracts and small, negative, and significant for the 4 to 6-month ahead contracts. On average, the federal funds futures market over-predicts the average effective federal funds rate by over 25 basis points in the high-volatility state across 2-month and longer contracts. This result contrasts with the low-volatility state where the futures rates miss the average effective federal funds rate by 5 basis points or less in all contracts on average. Conditional on being in regime S t = i, the probability of remaining in that regime is approximately 0.86 for i = 0 and 0.97 for i = 1 for all 2-month and longer ahead contracts.
The filtered and smoothed probabilities of being in the high-volatility state appear in Figure  1 . Each panel shows the results for a different contract length where the dashed lines correspond to the filtered probabilities and the solid lines denote the smoothed probabilities. The filtered probability of regime i at time t is given by P [S t = i|Ω t ], where Ω t reflects information from all previous and current observations at time t. The smoothed probability of regime i at time t is given by P [S t = i|Ω T ], where Ω T reflects information from all past, current, and future observations at time t. While the probabilities do differ slightly across contract length, certain distinct patterns emerge in the probability plots across all contract lengths. The federal funds futures market enters the high-volatility state during the middle of 1998 and returns to the low-volatility state by the beginning of 1999 in all contracts. In addition, all contracts switch to the high-volatility state again in 2000 and switch back at the end of 2001. The Markov-switching framework finds that the futures market enters the low-volatility state in all contracts by 2003.
The two distinct states from the Markov-switching model suggest different conclusions regarding the expectations hypothesis and the need to adjust futures rates for excess returns. Futures rates in the high-volatility state reject the expectations hypothesis by the significance of the average excess return. In the high-volatility state, futures rates clearly require adjustment for excess returns in order to accurately measure monetary policy expectations. This conclusion differs starkly from the findings of the low-volatility state. Futures rates in the low-volatility state generally follow the expectations hypothesis and do not require adjustment for excess returns. The Markov-switching framework shows that excess returns matter greatly in some periods and matter little at other times. Understanding when futures rates require adjustment is crucial in using these contracts to derive the correct expected path of monetary policy. Davig and Gerlach (2006) , studies the reaction of asset prices to monetary policy. This field often excludes intermeeting moves of the federal funds rate target by the FOMC in its analysis due to the unexpected nature and large effect of such policy actions. 6 These moves drastically affect the federal funds futures market by suddenly changing the effective federal funds rate and the market's expectations for the upcoming FOMC meetings. Over the 1995-2006 sample period of this paper, the FOMC makes intermeeting rate cuts on October 15, 1998; January 3, 2001; April 18, 2001; and September 17, 2001. The FOMC cut the federal funds rate target by 25 basis points for the intermeeting move during 1998 and by 50 basis points for the three moves in 2001. The large and unexpected shock of these moves to the futures market could help explain the existence of the high-volatility state in the excess returns. 6 Intermeeting moves are surprise policy actions that do not occur at one of the regularly scheduled meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Figure 2 plots the filtered probability of the high-volatility regime across all contract lengths where the shaded areas indicate contracts affected by intermeeting rate cuts of the FOMC. The shaded regions reflect contracts where an intermeeting rate cut takes place in the interval [t, t + n], where n denotes the contract length. Intuitively, the shaded region indicates that an intermeeting rate cut takes place between the sample of the futures rate at time t and the expiration of the contract at time t + n. The interval length increases with contract length due to the increasing length of time between the sample of the futures rate and the contract expiration. Since the futures market does not expect these intermeeting moves, I use only the filtered probability in Figure 3 since it only conditions on past and current observations. The shaded areas in Figure 2 always correspond with a change to the high-volatility regime. Using the 1-month ahead contracts, we see that each intermeeting rate cut from 1995-2006 correlates with a switch to the high-volatility regime. Additionally, the length of time spent in the high-volatility regime around each intermeeting move increases with contract length. In 2001, three distinct switches and reversals occur in the 1-month ahead contract which gradually length to one longer duration high-volatility regime in the 5 and 6-month ahead contracts. The timing of the switch to the high-volatility regime moves back one previous period with each additional month contract due to contract overlap. While the probability plots differ slightly across contract length, intermeeting rate cuts correlate with the changes in regime across all contracts in 1998 and 2000-2001.
Intermeeting Rate Cuts by the FOMC
Alternative Model using Ordinary Least Squares
Intermeeting rate cuts correspond with much of the existence of the high-volatility state identified by the Markov-switching framework. An ordinary least squares regression with a intermeeting rate cut variable is a natural alternative to the Markov-switching framework. This alternative model allows for comparison with previous studies and provides regression statistics (such as R 2 ) which are unavailable in the switching regressions. 7 The following ordinary least squares specification is an alternative to the Markov-switching framework: rx
t+n is the excess return on the n-month ahead contract, α (n) is a constant, D t represents the intermeeting rate cut variable, and ε (n) t+n denotes the error term. Equation (4) uses Newey-West (1987) standard errors with (n − 1) lags to allow for the autocorrelation under equation (1) . 8 D t is assigned the value of the intermeeting rate cut in basis points if an intermeeting rate cut occurs in the interval [t, t + n] and a value of 0 otherwise. For example, D t takes the value of 25 7 All of the R 2 values that appear in this paper are adjusted R 2 values. 8 The results are robust with respect to more lags or alternative specifications which reduce the autocorrelation (See Appendix A).
for the 1-month ahead contract sample at the end of September 1998. I also allow the effect of intermeeting rates cuts to be cumulative if two intermeeting moves occur during the sample to expiration interval. For example, D t is assigned the value of 100 for 6-month ahead rate at the end of December 2000 since two intermeeting rate cuts of 50 basis points each occur between t and t+n. 9 The results for equation (4) appear in Table 2 and show that this model fits the excess returns data well. The effect of an intermeeting rate cut by the FOMC is statistically significant at a high level and increases with contract length. A 50 basis point intermeeting rate cut correlates with 32 basis points of excess returns on a 1-month ahead contract and almost 100 basis points on a 6-month ahead contract. The intermeeting rate cut coefficient is less than one-to-one with the excess returns on the short term contracts because the payout on the excess returns depends on the average effective federal funds rate over the contract expiration month. On the longer term contracts, the larger than one-to-one coefficient on the intermeeting rate cut variable shows that an intermeeting move also correlates with additional future unexpected policy loosening before the contract expiration. For contracts longer than 2-months, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a zero average excess return. For the 1 and 2-month contracts, equation (4) finds a small average excess return of about 1 basis point per month. Intermeeting rate cuts are able to explain much of the variation in the excess returns. The R 2 values for equation (4) 
Previous Risk-Adjustment Mechanisms
Consistent with the findings of the Markov-switching framework, Piazzesi 
where ∆N F P t−1 is the year-over-year percentage change from time t−13 to t−1 in the logarithm of nonfarm payroll employment. The ∆N F P t−1 series for employment growth contains the real-time data estimates known at time t using the real-time data archive from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The results for equation (5) over the 1995-2006 sample period of this paper appear in Table 3 Since intermeeting rate cuts are correlated with business cycles, the results of models (4) and (5) make drawing conclusions of about the exact nature of excess returns difficult. I propose adding ∆N F P t−1 and f (n) t into the OLS intermeeting rate cut model to clarify the relationship between excess returns, business cycles, and intermeeting rate cuts. Over the 1995-2006 sample period, I estimate the following model:
where D t represents the intermeeting rate cut effect variable. The results of model (6) appear in Table 4 . After controlling for the effect of intermeeting rate cuts, ∆N F P t−1 and f (n) t do not explain as much of the variation in excess returns as the previous results in Table 3 show. Adding ∆N F P t−1 and f Table 3 . In addition to the small increase in R 2 , the coefficient estimates of α (n) , β (n) 1 , and β (n) 2 are all roughly half as large as previous estimates from Table 3 . While most of the coefficients remain statistically significant, this change in shows that not properly accounting for intermeeting rate cuts biases the coefficient estimates away from zero. The coefficients on the intermeeting rate cuts variable remain highly statistically significant and are similar to the estimates from Table 2 .
Adding ∆N F P t−1 and f (n) t into the OLS intermeeting rate cut model helps clarify the relationship between business cycles and intermeeting rate cuts on the excess returns over the 1995-2006 sample period. After controlling for the effect of intermeeting rate cuts by the FOMC, the change in nonfarm payrolls and the current futures rate do not explain as much of the variation in excess returns as previous estimates. Over the longer term 5 and 6-month ahead contracts, excess returns do still have some correlation with business cycles, but that correlation is much smaller than the results in Table 3 . In addition, not controlling for intermeeting rate cuts biases the coefficient estimates of model (5) away from zero. The results from model (6) suggest that intermeeting rate cuts, as opposed to business cycles, explain much of the variation in the excess returns over the 1995-2006 sample period.
Real-Time Forecasting
Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) determine that excess returns in the 1988-2005 sample period are also predictable using a regression on a constant, the change in nonfarm payrolls, and the current futures rate. This section shows that this claim is not robust to the later 1995-2006 sample period. This result strengthens the case for unadjusted futures rates as a measure of monetary policy expectations.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the excess return models, I perform pseudo out-of-sample forecasts using the unadjusted futures rates, the Markov-switching model from this paper, and the Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) model both with and without the intermeeting rate cut variable. I use the period from January 1995-December 1998 to estimate parameters for the January 1999 forecast. I continue by adding the January 1999 observation to the estimation data and forecasting the excess returns for the rest of my sample using a rolling endpoint regression.
The timing element of the excess returns data presents particular challenges to the forecasting models. Forecasts are made at time t about the effective federal funds rate over month t + n, where n denotes the contract length. The difference between these two values represents the excess return at time t. This gap between the forecast and the realization of the excess returns means that the models can only use parameter estimates from models before t − n. The forecast can include information up through time t, but the parameter estimates can only be determined from time t−n due to the timing lag in the creation of the excess returns in equation (1) .
From Piazzesi and Swanson (2006), the forecast errors of the federal funds futures contracts are as follows:
−rx
where −rx
t+n is the negative excess returns of the n-month ahead contract at time t. Under the expectations hypothesis, the unadjusted futures rates imply:
Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) reject the expectations hypothesis in favor of a time-varying excess return and adjust futures rates for risk using equation (5) as follows:
I propose also adding an intermeeting rate cut variable, as in equation (6), to correct for the biases of past intermeeting rate cuts. Adding the intermeeting rate cut variable produces the following excess return model:
Finally, a Markov-switching framework as in equation (3) has the ability to capture excess returns in the federal funds futures by adjusting the futures rates using the following formula:
where P (S t+n = 0|Ω t−n ) P (S t+n = 1|Ω t−n ) =
The vector [P (S t+n = 0|Ω t−n ) P (S t+n = 1|Ω t−n )] forecasts the probability of being in each respective state using the Markov-chain from (2) and the current filtered probability of each state up through time t − n. The parameters from the Markov-chain are the estimates up through time t − n using the Hamilton (1989) filter. These two probabilities are multiplied by the estimates of the state-dependent average excess returns to create a single weighted average forecast for the two states. 10 The results for the the rolling endpoint predictive regression forecasts appear in Table 5 . The forecasting methods are evaluated with respect to mean error (ME) and root mean square error (RMSE). Over 1 to 3-month ahead contracts, the unadjusted futures and both Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) models perform well. All three forecasting methods have similar root mean square error values with the unadjusted futures edging slightly lower in the shorter term contracts. The unadjusted futures do however make larger mean errors than either of the Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) models. Adding the intermeeting effect variable only slightly improves the performance of the Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) model. For the 1 to 3-month ahead contracts, the Markov-switching model performs very poorly with larger mean and root mean square errors. Using the probability plots in Figure 1 and the work of Bessec and Bouabdallah (2005) , the misclassification of the future regimes most likely contributes to the poor performance of the switching model over the shorter term contracts. Over the 4 to 6-month contracts, however, the unadjusted futures and the Markov-switching model perform better than the Piazzesi and Swanson models. With respect to RMSE, the unadjusted futures and the Markov-switching models have almost identical results. In addition, the Markov-switching model makes smaller mean errors in the longer term contracts than the unadjusted futures. The Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) models perform worse in the longer-term contracts with larger root mean square errors. Adding the intermeeting effect variable, however, slightly improves the forecasts by correcting for the biases in the coefficients discussed in the previous section. The intermeeting effect variable improves the RMSE of the 6-month ahead basis points by over 2 basis points. These results indicate that neither of the Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) models or the Markov-switching models can outperform the futures rates over all contract lengths.
The out-of-sample forecasts of 1999-2006 show that, jointly across all contract lengths, the unadjusted futures rates cannot be outperformed by either one of the Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) risk-adjustment mechanisms or a Markov-switching framework. This conclusion differs from the findings of Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) and can be reconciled with the results from this paper. Section 3.4 shows that after controlling for intermeeting rate cuts, the change in nonfarm payrolls and the current futures rates do not explain much of the variation in excess returns. Models (4) and (6) show that intermeeting rate cuts account for much of variance in the excess returns over the 1995-2006 period. Thus, the predictability of excess returns rests on the predictability of intermeeting rate cuts, not on the predictability of business cycles. Since intermeeting moves are unexpected and hence not predictable by nature, excess returns are not generally predictable over the 1995-2006 sample period. These results show that futures rates in general do not require adjustment for excess returns except due to intermeeting moves.
Conclusion
This paper uses several models to examine excess returns in federal funds futures contracts over the 1995-2006 period. The results in this paper show that futures rates do not require adjustment after controlling for high-volatility periods which correlate with intermeeting rate cuts by the FOMC. This paper also examines previous excess return models and helps clarify the relationship between excess returns, business cycles, and intermeeting moves. After accounting for the effect of intermeeting rate cuts, business cycles do not explain much of the variation in excess returns. In addition, excess returns are not predictable in general since intermeeting rate cuts, not business cycles, can account for much of the variability of excess returns. This paper also shows the importance of taking into account the change in Federal Reserve communication policy in 1994. This policy change fundamentally alters the relationship between business cycles and excess returns. This paper shows that using excess returns models without the ability to control for these changes over the whole sample period can lead to results that are not robust across subsets of that sample period. Researchers need to either use only the post-1994 sample period or use models that have the ability to capture discrete changes in the time series properties of the excess returns over the 1988-2006 period. Hamilton (2007) shows that a model using a t-distribution and a time trend in the variance fits the monthly excess returns data better than a normal distribution with constant variance. This paper makes a case that discrete changes due to policy changes and intermeeting policy moves may also need to be modeled in order to accurately study federal funds futures contracts using monthly data.
A Robustness With Respect To Autocorrelation
A.1 Ordinary Least Squares By Regime
As a robustness check for autocorrelation within each regime in the Markov-switching model, I run an ordinary least squares version of (3) by regime using Newey-West HAC standard errors with (n − 1) lags. Observations are split into the two regimes using the smoothed probability estimates from the regime switching model. Specifically, observations are included with regime i if P [S t = i|Ω T ] ≥ 0.5 for i = 0, 1. The estimates of this model appear in Table 6 . The results agree with the results of the Markov-switching framework which indicates that autocorrelation within each regime does not drive the results.
A.2 One-Month Holding Period Excess Returns
Piazzesi and Swanson (2006) suggest an alternative specification which represents the excess returns that would be realized if an investor buys an n-month ahead contract at time t, holds it for only one month, and sells the contract back as an (n − 1)-month ahead contract at time t + 1. Using previous notation, I denote the excess return during this one-month holding period as:
Although I lose one observation using equation (12), this alternative specification reduces the problem of autocorrelation in the excess returns by eliminating overlapping contracts.
A.3 Markov-Switching Average One-Month Holding Period Excess Returns
To test the robustness of the previous findings with respect to autocorrelation, I apply the Markovswitching framework to the average one-month holding period excess returns by estimating:
where rf (n) t+1 denotes the realized excess return of the one-month holding period of the n-month ahead contract, α (n) is a constant, S t is the unobserved state variable, and ε
The parameter estimates for equation (13) appear in Table 7 and Figure 3 contains the probability plots of being in the high-volatility regime. The switching framework again identifies two distinct regimes with different state-dependent variances across all contract lengths. In the highvolatility state, the coefficient estimates range from 8 basis points on the 1-month ahead contract to almost 30 basis points on a 6-month ahead contract with all but the 2-month ahead contract being significant. Equation (13) also finds similar results in the low-volatility regime with small and insignificant point estimates of α (n) in all contract lengths. The probability of staying in the same regime remains about 0.87 for the high-volatility regime for 2-month and longer contracts and 0.94 for the low-volatility regime. The probability plots of being in the high-volatility regime look similar to the previous results. Across all contracts, the federal funds futures market enters the high-volatility regime in 1998 and 2000-2001. In addition, all contracts enter the low-volatility state by 2003. Except for lack of precision in some of the 2-month ahead point estimates, the average one-month holding period excess return results agree with the results from the excess returns of equation (3).
A.4 Alternative OLS Model using One-Month Holding Period Excess Returns
Especially in longer-term contracts, the intermeeting rate cut variable in (4) could be corresponding to broader business cycle movements. As an alternative specification, I use the one-month holding period excess returns and run the following regression:
Since this specification removes overlapping contracts, D t now only takes nonzero values for four observations as opposed to the 4n observations of equation (4) Table 8 and confirm my previous results. Across all contracts, I find a highly significant effect of intermeeting moves by the FOMC. In all contract lengths, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of a zero average excess return. I am able to explain over 36% of the variation in the 4-month ahead and shorter contracts. This result is surprising considering D t dummies less that 3% of my overall sample for each contract and explains much of the variation in the one-month holding period excess returns. This result shows that after controlling for the effect of intermeeting moves, the one-month holding period excess returns also follow the expectations hypothesis and do not require adjustment in general. 
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Coefficients appear in basis points with t-statistics in parenthesis. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
t+n is the excess return of the n-month ahead contract, α (n) is a constant, D t is the intermeeting rate cut variable, and ε (n) t+n denotes the error term. Coefficients appear in basis points with HAC t-statistics in parenthesis. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
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t+n is the excess return of the n-month ahead contract, α (n) is a constant, ∆N F P t−1 is the year-over-year change in the logarithm of nonfarm payroll employment, f (n) t is the futures rate of an n-month ahead contract at time t, and ε (n) t+n denotes the error term. Coefficients appear in basis points with HAC tstatistics in parenthesis. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
t+n is the excess return of the n-month ahead contract, α (n) is a constant, ∆N F P t−1 is the year-over-year change in the logarithm of nonfarm payroll employment, f (n) t is the futures rate of an n-month ahead contract at time t, D t is the intermeeting rate cut variable, and ε (n) t+n denotes the error term. Coefficients appear in basis points with HAC t-statistics in parenthesis. The marginal R 2 is the increase in R 2 by adding ∆N F P t−1 and f (n) t to model (4) of Table 2 . ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
t+n is the excess return of the n-month ahead contract, α (n) is a constant, and ε (n) t+n denotes the error term. Observations are split into regimes using probability estimates from the estimation of equation (3) . Coefficients appear in basis points with HAC t-statistics in parenthesis. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
t+1 , where rf (n) t+1 denotes the realized excess return of the one-month holding period of the n-month ahead contract, α (n) is a constant, S t is the unobserved state variable, and ε (n) t+1 ∼ N (0, σ(S t ) 2 ). Coefficients appear in basis points with t-statistics in parenthesis. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
t+1 , where rf (n)
t+1 is the one-month holding period excess return of the n-month ahead contract, α (n) is a constant, D t is the intermeeting rate cut variable, and ε (n) t+n denotes the error term. Coefficients appear in basis points with HAC tstatistics in parenthesis. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
